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AbstrAct: Proxy advisory firms are relatively new 
entities in the corporate landscape particularly in the 
general context of  shareholders’ voting devices. Firms 
of  the kind were established with the aim of  as-
sisting investors/shareholders with their expertise in 
how to vote their shares. These third-party consul-
tants are not regulated by any government agency in 
most of  the countries and not even required to disclose 
the methodology used to render their recommenda-
tions. The lack of  accountability of  proxy advisors 
but also the possible conflict of  interests spotted in 
their activities have been constant concerns since the 
kinetic force of  international commerce will certainly 
spread firms of  the type all over the world. In this 
context it may be appropriate to start considering an 
international convention on the matter.
resumen: Las agencias de consejo de vo-
tación son entidades relativamente nuevas 
en el panorama corporativo, especialmen-
te en el contexto de los mecanismos de voto 
de los accionistas. Las agencias de este tipo 
fueron creadas con el ánimo de asistir a los 
inversionistas/accionistas con su consejo 
en cómo votar sus acciones. Este tipo de 
consultores no se encuentran regulados por 
agencia alguna en la mayoría de los países 
ni se les requiere informar sobre la meto-
dología utilizada para llevar a cabo sus re-
comendaciones. La falta de imputabilidad 
de las agencias de consejo de votación, así 
como los posibles conflictos de intereses 
que han sido identificados en el desarro-
llo de sus actividades son preocupaciones 
constantes, puesto que la fuerza cinética del 
comercio internacional dispersará a em-
presas de este tipo en todo el mundo. En 
este contexto, parece apropiado comenzar 
a considerar una convención internacional 
en la materia.
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I. introduCtion
The participation of  shareholders in corporations is derived from their con-
tribution to the corporation assets; in publicly held corporations, this contri-
bution is made by the acquisition of  shares, where the share is basically “a 
unit of  interest in the corporation based on a contribution to the corporate 
capital”.1 This share, as derived from a contract, implies rights and obliga-
tions for both the shareholders and the corporation. As owners of  shares, 
shareholders hold rights against their corporation;2 among those, the rights 
to control and management3 include the right to vote.
Nonetheless, shareholders influence over the corporation cannot be 
wielded directly; the management faculties of  shareholders may be ex-
pressed only throughout the decisions taken at shareholders meetings. 
Therefore, the proper way for stockholders to exercise power over the cor-
poration is to vote on decisions in general meetings. The vote in general 
meetings is used for various purposes such as the election and eventual re-
moval of  directors or the making of  amendments to the charter of  the cor-
poration or its bylaws. But more important, holding a share implies the right 
“to have the corporation managed honestly and prudently for the benefit 
and profit of  the shareholders within the scope of  the authorized business”.4 
1  Cox, James et al., Corporations, New York, Aspen Law & Business, 1997, p. 306.
2  Those may be rights: as to control and management, proprietary rights and reme-
dial rights.
3  Other kinds of  rights arise by holding shares in a corporation, as for example: pro-
prietary rights including the right to participate in dividends distribution or the right to 
participate in distribution in case of  liquidation and remedial rights, for example the right 
to information and inspection of  corporate records. This paper focuses only on the rights 
of  control and management specifically the voting rights.
4  Cox, James, op. cit., p. 306.
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This cursory thought recalls the massive importance of  voting processes in 
the corporate scenario, particularly in publicly held companies.
All legal owners of  voting shares in a stock corporation have a right 
to be present and vote at all corporate meetings, normally, on the basis of  
one share one vote.5 The particular voting provisions are established by 
the corporate bylaws, but some legislations establishes the general rule; 
for instance, the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) has recognized 
the common practice in the United States6 and in Mexico the provisions 
concerning the voting shares are established by the Ley General de Socie-
dades Mercantiles (LGSME).7
At the early ages of  industrialization when companies were consol-
idated, the physical presence of  shareholders was the best and almost 
the only effective way to manage the corporation. However, nowadays it 
seems extremely difficult to compel all stockholders to attend personally 
to shareholders’ meetings especially in publicly held corporations. This 
would be not just unpractical but almost impossible for various reasons: 
firstly because nowadays stockholders may acquire shares through stock 
markets of  a company without having a minimum contact with the corpo-
ration and secondly because share markets are open for buyers around the 
world making a difficult matter the geographical dispersion. Furthermore, 
in public corporations the amount of  shares issued implies a large number 
of  holders and it is a hard and expensive task to gather all shareholders8 of  
a public corporation at least once a year to discuss corporate matters.
5  Notwithstanding, it may be the case that corporations’ shares may be classified in 
different series of  shares with specific characteristics, some of  them with preference rights 
over others, no further analysis at this respect was considered necessary for the aim of  this 
paper.
6  Model Business Corporation Act, published by the American Bar Association, 3rd 
Edition, 2003. Section 7.21: (a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (d) or unless the 
articles of  incorporation provide otherwise, each outstanding share, regardless of  class, is 
entitled to one vote on each matter voted on at a shareholders’ meeting. Only shares are 
entitled to vote.
7  The provisions concerning voting rights change for the different types of  ‘corpora-
tions’ recognized under Mexican law. For the sake of  this paper, sole account for the provi-
sions concerning the ‘Sociedad Anónima’ will be made (Chapter V, LGSME).
8  In this sense see; Cary, L. William and Eisenberg, Melvin Aron, Cases and Materials on 
Corporations, 7th ed., New York, The Foundation Press, 1995, p. 300: “Physical attendance 
at a shareholders’ meetings is normally an uneconomical use of  a shareholder’s time when 
he can vote by proxy”.
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For meetings to be held and other operations to be transacted, share-
holders unable to attend personally appointed agents to represent them 
in meetings. Today the activity of  voting in behalf  of  absent shareholders 
has become common practice worldwide; this representation is ensured 
by a specific document called proxy.9 In a wide definition of  the term, a 
proxy may be understood as a person appointed in place of  another to 
represent him. This concept applied in US corporate law has a narrower 
meaning; it is generally understood as the person appointed by the stock-
holder in order to vote in his behalf  at the shareholders’ meetings.10
Legislation in various countries allows shareholders to exercise their 
vote through a third person, by mail or online, depending on the case 
granted by the corporations’ bylaws. This process is known as proxy vot-
ing11. Granting of  proxies may be issued for a specific meeting or as a 
general unrestricted proxy.12 In both cases the proxy granted is revocable 
9  As defined by the Black’s Law dictionary: PROXY (Contracted from procuracy). A 
person who is substituted or deputed by another to represent him and act for him, par-
ticularly in some meeting or public body. An agent representing and acting for principal. 
Also the instrument containing the appointment of  such person. Manson v. Curtis, 223 
N. Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559, 561, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 247; Cliffs Corporation v. United States, 
C.C.A. Ohio, 103, F.2d 77, 80. Black’s Law Dictionary, Definitions of  the Terms and Phrases 
of  American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern, 4th edition, West Publishing 
Co., 1968.
10  It is important to bare in mind, in order to avoid any confussion, that proxy may be 
also used to refer to the instrument that empowers the appointed person or even the agent 
himself.
11  In the United States the MBCA establishes at section 7. 22, the legal framework for 
proxies: § 7.22. PROXIES (a) A shareholder may vote his shares in person or by proxy. (b) 
A shareholder or his agent or attorney-in-fact may appoint a proxy to vote or otherwise act 
for the shareholder by signing an appointment form, or by an electronic transmission. An 
electronic transmission must contain or be accompanied by information from which one 
can determine that the shareholder, the shareholder’s agent, or the shareholder’s attorney-
in-fact authorized the transmission. Nevertheless proxy voting is a global common practice, 
some examples of  it can be found in the United Kingdom, the Companies Act 2006 recog-
nizes in its section 324 that “a member of  a company is entitled to appoint another person 
as his proxy to exercise all or any of  his rights to attend and to speak and vote at a meeting 
of  the company”. In France there is also the possibility for shareholders to be represented 
at shareholders’ meetings in the basis of  article L225-106 of  the Commercial Code and so 
forth among diverse countries with different legal systems. It is possible to say that casting 
voting rights is a common practice, widely recognized in regulation around the world. 
12  A general proxy may be understood as general power of  attorney to vote on ordi-
nary matters of  the corporation.
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(as agency in general) if  it is not coupled with an interest. Thus, the pos-
sibility for shareholders to appoint agents in order to vote in their behalf  
at corporate meetings is the ground over which a system has been created, 
the proxy system of  voting; scheme which is nowadays common practice in 
publicly held corporations worldwide.
Without any doubt, the shareholders’ possibility to delegate their voting 
rights to agents has simplified the management of  corporations. Further-
more, it is possible to say that based on proxy voting process some devices13 
have been created to enhance corporate governance. Usually, the proxy 
voting process in large corporations is usually triggered when the Board of  
Directors mails the shareholders the notice for the meeting to be held and 
an attached document containing a proxy request for the signature of  share-
holders. It is certainly a pragmatic practice in order to allow the Board 
to gather the quorum required for binding decisions. This method would 
seem accurate when there is a general consensus among shareholders and 
between them and the board; nevertheless, we must acknowledge that this 
is not a normal scenario in huge corporations where the real situations are 
fulfilled with strong disagreements in general meetings.14
In recent times, the mechanics of  voting systems in corporations have 
suffered an interesting evolution with the rise of  new entities offering con-
sulting services and creating new products in the corporate market ser-
vice’s. In the scenario drafted by proxy voting and voting devices, some 
specialists sought a possibility to intervene and develop a new form of  
business aiming the advice to shareholders in how to vote their shares.
Since most of  shareholders lacked the expertise and adequate infor-
mation that would enable them to make the better decision for their own 
interest, these new entities emerged when shareholders of  large corpora-
tions sought for information and a pertinent advice about the corporate 
governance at their companies. In this context some entrepreneurs pro-
posed an answer to this technical demand of  stockholders by creating 
specialized firms. These firms were incorporated with different purposes, 
13  Among these instruments there are the pools of  voting shares, voting trusts, and 
more recently the voting through proxy firms. No deeper analysis shall be conducted in 
order to avoid failing out of  the main objective in this paper that is to acute the study of  
proxy advisory firms.
14  Consequently, the above-mentioned practice presents some problems, especially for 
minority stockholders because it leaves the holders of  a small number of  shares without 
choice but to delegate his or her vote to an agent.
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but in particular with the aim of  voting shares in behalf  of  shareholders 
and providing research and advise as how they may vote in their meetings. 
Such entities are known today as Proxy Advisors or Proxy Firms and are con-
sidered as independent advisors for the corporate governance, becoming 
in recent years a high lucrative activity, they are “third-party consultants 
that charge institutional investors for advice about a specific company, 
and provide ‘for’ or ‘against’ recommendations on shareholder voting 
issues”.15 In this paper, the scrutiny will be devoted to the advising role of  
proxy firms since it has been the target of  criticism and controversy.
It is important to say that these firms have been favored by a phe-
nomenon of  shareholders’ activism that has manifested with greater force 
after situations involving unscrupulous corporate governance in publicly 
held corporations. After the drama performed by Boards of  Directors 
the past decade, the general meetings have turned on to corporate arenas 
were fights for control take place, encouraging the stockholders to take an 
active role in the meetings. In this situation proxy firms have the merit to 
have accurately realized that for minority shareholders it was difficult to ap-
praise the importance of  corporate decisions; furthermore, that it takes 
time and money to study and analyze the best option to vote in public 
held corporations.
It must be noticed that the aim of  proxy firms is in essence, to give 
voting counsel for shareholders but not take away the right of  vote. Proxy 
firms are hired by shareholders to cast proxy statement votes on their be-
half  on the diverse matters that require shareholder’s approval at publicly 
held corporations. Also, it is important to consider that proxy advisors 
have no authority to raise issues on their own; their activity is limited to 
the counsel and advice for others. Normally, proxy advisors have no power 
to vote if  they are note expressly authorized to do so by the stockholders. 
Their basic activity is compelled to provide information to shareholders 
or institutional investors16 as the case may be, which have the possibility to 
hire this kind of  services or not.
15  Choi, Stephen J. and Fisch, Jill E., “How to fix Wall Street: a voucher financing 
proposal for securities intermediaries”, 113 yale L. J. 269, 294 (2003), taken from Slaght, 
Jodi, “Whatever Happened to the Prudent Man? The Case for Limiting the Influence of  
Proxy Advisors Through Fiduciary Duty Law”, 9 Rutgers Bus. L. Rev. 1 2012.
16  Institutional investors are entities with large amounts to invest, such as investment 
companies, mutual funds, brokerages, insurance companies, pension funds and investment 
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Having sketched the main idea behind proxy voting and proxy advi-
sors a deeper analysis of  the current landscape of  the latter is of  capital 
importance in order to grasp the real dimension of  this issue.
II. Current landsCaPe oF Proxy advisors
Within the industry of  proxy advisors a short group of  corporations have 
acquired a strong worldwide presence and dominated the greater part of  
this market. In the United States two main firms appropriated the leading 
role in the proxy advisory business, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)17 and 
Glass Lewis & Co. In Europe, the most important proxy advisor was estab-
lished since 1995 and is known under the name of  Manifest,18 in France the 
entity incorporated under the name of  Proxinvest develop the proxy advisory 
industry as part of  the European Corporate Governance Services (ECGS) 
which provides the analysis over six hundred of  the most important listed 
corporations in Europe.
It is important to take into account the fact that institutional inves-
tors spend in thousands of  companies, making a huge task to conduct an 
independent research on each one of  them every time corporate matters 
banks; they account for a majority of  overall volume of  shares and are the biggest partici-
pants in securities trading. The share of  stock market volumes of  institutional investors has 
consistently grown over the years and so their participation in public held corporations. 
Institutional investors are considered as a unit while acquiring shares, nevertheless they 
represent the interests of  hundreds of  investors, with which the institution holds fiduciary 
duties. In recent corporate history they have gained great strength in the business land-
scape.
17  The statistics of  the corporations advised by ISS are quite impressive. Offering 
services for 25 years, ISS has been the leading provider of  proxy research to institutional 
investors. From information published in its public web site, ISS cover more than 39,000 
companies in over 115 countries worldwide. The offer of  services includes standard bench-
mark policies but also policy solutions whereby ISS implements voting recommendations 
based on shareholders’ specific corporate governance guidelines. Available on http://www.
issgovernance.com/proxy/advisory.
18  From the public web site: www.manifest.co.uk. Manifest proxy firm, is presented as 
an independent, global proxy voting and corporate governance support service. Their 
mission is “To Make Things Clear”, with the aim to empower shareholders to support 
their stewardship responsibilities with comprehensive research and voting services, which 
enable informed decision-making. They make the point over the independent and conflict-
free proxy governance support services, offering an analysis consistent and impartial.
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are to be voted in shareholders meetings. That would amount institutional 
investors paying a lot of  money to get the job dully done. Notwithstand-
ing, the reality points-out to corporations trying to keep expenses low and 
opting instead for proxy advisors’ services. At this respect there is also a 
conflictive opinion, mostly from the professionals at proxy advisory firms 
who state that their only “crime” is to represent a threat to the autocracy 
of  the CEO and incumbent boards through advice to shareholders in vot-
ing on the particular matters.
It is precisely the participation of  institutional investors that have fa-
vored the rise of  the advisory industry and increased exponentially the 
influence of  proxy advisers. The need of  services provided by corpora-
tions such as ISS or Glass Lewis to institutional investors that manage 
huge portfolios with thousands of  corporations is the origin of  the great 
incomes of  proxy advisory firms and for which the use of  proxy advisory 
firms represents savings of  time and effort. 
The services provided by proxy advisors represent a fundamental role 
in the activities carried on by institutional investors since the latter look for 
an advice when voting billions of  ballots at annual meetings in thousands 
of  corporations. It would be a hard and a very expensive work for insti-
tutional investors to prepare research about the corporate status of  every 
entity in which they hold titles in order to be able to offer a conscious 
propositions at shareholders’ meetings; therefore, outsourcing this activity 
to proxy firms implies enormous savings for investors.
Furthermore, a recent trend of  shareholders activism19 has also a 
huge influence over institutional investors, which seem nowadays more 
19  Which differs from the ‘shareholders activism’ of  the early 1970’s, when the politi-
cal and social conditions in the United States exerted a great influence over corporations. 
In the activism of  the 70’s shareholders of  publicly held corporations sought to enforce 
political pressure over companies involved in social confrontations by mean of  sharehold-
ers decisions in general meetings. The pressure came through derivate or class actions by 
shareholders who intended to affect the management of  corporations. Shareholders activ-
ism led to decisions on social and political shareholders proposals, cases such as Medical 
Committee for Human Rights v. Securities and Exchange Commission 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
involving a motion to amend the corporation’s charter to forbid it to make napalm without 
several limitations on its use while the apogee of  Vietnam War or Peck v. Greyhound Corp. 97 
F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) regarding a shareholder proposal requesting reconsideration 
of  segregated seating in the hardest time of  American segregation were cases in which a 
real activism was enhanced by shareholders. On the contrary the “activism” in our days 
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conscious about social and governance considerations, including proxy 
voting across a wide range of  issues. It is a fact that analyzing corporate 
governance at companies and helping institutional investors decide how 
to vote at annual meetings has become a big business. The enhancement 
of  shareholders activism and the recognition of  corporate governance as 
a major risk has increased the demand for such services and thrust the 
leading firms into an influential position.
In this context, there has been a great concern for academics and 
regulators about the important role acquired by proxy firms and the great 
power of  influence that they may have. For instance, the United States 
Government Accountability Office20 (GAO) triggered an investigation 
motivated on the background for criticism of  the expanding activities of  
proxy firms. Consequently, special attention was paid to the hugest players 
in the proxy firm arena such as ISS.21 The GAO issued a report22 that in-
cluded an overview of  the major proxy advisory firms that may be useful 
to clarify the standing position of  the five largest firms.
Firm Founded Estimated 
number 
of  employees
Estimated 
number 
of  clients
Estimated clients’ 
equity assets 
(dollars)
Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS)
1985 630 1,700 25.5 trillion
Marco Consulting 
Group (MCG)
1988 70 350 85 trillion
has increased, in the opinion of  some academics, as a reaction by investors to the massive 
financial frauds perpetrated by management of  public companies.
20  The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, nonpartisan 
agency that works for Congress. Often called the “congressional watchdog,” GAO investi-
gates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars. For further information about 
the office see http://www.gao.gov. 
21  ISS (some experts estimate) is the largest proxy adviser, was bought for proximately 
$550 million by Risk Metrics Group; seven years before, ISS was sold to other investors for 
about $50 million dollars. That implies an exponential growth of  the corporation’s value 
in a relatively short period of  time. Risk Metrics had $303 million of  revenues in 2009. Al-
most half  or $145 million came from the ISS segment. In 2010, the company issued proxy 
and vote recommendations for more than 37,000 shareholder meetings in 108 countries 
and voted 7.6 million ballots representing over 1.3 trillion shares. From, Proxy Advisors Find 
Themselves in the Spotlight, May 17, 2010 by James Hyatt. 
22  Report GAO-07-765 on Proxy Advisory Services.
Esta revista forma parte del acervo de la Biblioteca Jurídica Virtual del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM 
www.juridicas.unam.mx https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/
BJV, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas-UNAM, 
2017
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iij.24484873e.2017.148.11003
SANTIAGO RAMÍREZ REYES346
D. R. © 2017. UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 
Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, núm. 148, pp. 337-359.
Firm Founded Estimated 
number 
of  employees
Estimated 
number 
of  clients
Estimated clients’ 
equity assets 
(dollars)
Glass Lewis & Company 2003 70 300 15 trillion
Proxy Governance, Inc. 
(PGI)
2004 31 100 1 trillion
Egan-Jones Proxy 
Services (Egan-Jones)
2005 Not available 400 Not available
From: GAO report.
It is undisputed that large proxy firms have achieved a strong and 
influent position. This situation in addition to the lack of  a proper regula-
tion regarding the activities developed by proxy advisors have created a 
scenario which seems not clear at all and which generates criticism among 
sectors in the corporate network. This scenario has been identified in re-
cent years in the United States and lately in Europe, inviting specialist to 
analyze this issues and which leads this paper to the next part in the ex-
amination.
III. Problems issued From Proxy votinG system
Before addressing the possible problems issued by proxy advisors, particular 
attention must be paid to the problems issued from the proxy voting system 
in general. As it has been mentioned, voting in publicly held corporations is 
in itself  a hard task; it implies for the stockholders to be not just aware, but 
well informed about the corporate management, the background of  pro-
posed decisions and the possible effects over the corporation. If  this work 
seems complex for one shareholder in only one corporation, the complexity 
grows exponentially in a scenario of  multiple investors gathered into one 
institutional investor, holding shares in hundreds of  corporations. More-
over, if  the direct voting process entails a degree of  complexity, the proxy 
voting system issues a higher degree of  difficulty, requiring more careful 
and detailed knowledge of  governance matters. Proxy voting devices have 
incurred in conflicts through history; thus, it is for sure that the latter devel-
oped devices such as proxy advisory firms may entail their own problems 
for which the legal framework must be prepared.
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Related to voting in general, some shareholders’ practices have been 
object of  legal discussion and answered through court decisions. For ex-
ample, some proxy holders have sought to pay to the share’s owners as 
compensation for being allowed to vote the owner’s shares. In general this 
practice of, vote selling has been considered as violating the law of  some 
of  the sister states in the United States. Nevertheless, “more recently, the 
Delaware courts have shifted from viewing vote-buying as per se invalid, to 
being voidable, subject to a test for intrinsic fairness”.23
The most common dilemma that presents voting devices is that those 
are used as weapons in proxy fights.24 In these conflicts the activist share-
holders (mostly the dissenting ones) try to persuade other shareholders to 
use their proxy votes to install new management for specific reasons. Usu-
ally, in a proxy fight, directors have a bulk of  tools in their favor over those 
trying to force the corporate change, they hold the strong position and are 
more freely to act while the shareholders may only pursue actions through 
shareholders meetings.
On the other hand dissenting shareholders, more often minority 
shareholders, use proxy devices such as voting trusts or pool of  voting 
shares in order to obtain more weight in shareholders’ meetings. Over this 
ground where the corporate management of  publicly held corporations 
is a field mined with difficulties and possible conflicts between directors 
and stockholders, the regulation of  proxy advisors must be analyzed with 
precaution, being so the capital interest of  this paper.
IV. Problems issued From Proxy advisory industry
Since the past decade, some academics, shareholders and regulators have 
started to issue questions regarding the services provided by proxy advi-
sors but also their behavior and performance; questions about the influence 
they exercise over business and the possible conflict of  interests derived 
from their expanding offer of  services. The main concern is that proxy 
firms must provide truly independent, conflict-free proxy research and vot-
23  Cox, James et al., op. cit., p. 332.
24  A proxy battle occurs when shareholders of  a corporation present opposition to the 
corporate governance, often against directors and management decisions.
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ing services; nevertheless, as services provided by proxy advisors have diver-
sified, the concerns have also multiplied.
The services offered by proxy advisors require a high degree of  pro-
fessionalism and responsibility for several reasons. First, it is important for 
proxy advisors to consider in their research, not only local market rules 
but also regulations in the international landscape. Second, the recom-
mendations they issue may have a direct impact over the company’s value 
and over the market, reason why their research must be conducted with 
integrity and accuracy of  data including not only primary information 
such as reports of  meetings or meetings notices. Third, the use of  proxy 
advisory firms represents for institutional investors and for shareholders 
in general, savings of  time and effort; nonetheless they must keep in mind 
that no two investors are exactly alike, and therefore the research con-
ducted for one shareholder may not be suitable for another one in the 
same situation. Lastly, it is important that proxy firms ensure, expressly, 
the confidentiality of  their clients’ voting intention; being engaged not 
to respond requests to disclose voting intentions, or to resold this kind of  
data or transmit it otherwise. 
At this stage, proxy advisory firms seem to be aware of  the possible 
conflicts that may arise in the scope of  their activities, and therefore try 
to guarantee their clients of  the high professionalism in their practices by 
performing marketing efforts in order to be considered as reliable advisors. 
Notwithstanding, the scope of  services provided by proxy firms has wid-
ened to include, for example, governance monitoring to help identifying 
contentious meetings in the client’s portfolio, ensuring that institutional 
investors would be able to monitor and audit their governance, voting and 
activism policies. These are some of  diverse services provided but the list 
is not exhaustive and may be as large as the need of  institutional investors.
The situation got so complicated that growing concerns made their 
way to the Congress of  the United States. On June 2007, the GAO issued 
a report in a Congress’ request entitled “Issues Relating to Firms That Advise 
Institutional Investors on Proxy Voting”. The GAO was demanded to provide a 
report,25 among other things, on potential problems that may arise from 
the services provided by the proxy advisory firms.
25  GAO-07-765 Proxy Advisory Services; this document contains a detailed analysis 
of  the actual landscape and the main worries of  industry associations and academics.
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The GAO report was based on Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) examinations and professional opinions. The Accountability Of-
fice found that some potential conflicts may arise, nevertheless recognized 
that the SEC did not identify any major violations; in this report no rec-
ommendations were issued. Different interesting and controversial issues 
were developed in this report among them, the possible conflicts of  inter-
ests, the lack of  competition and the disproportionate influence advisors 
have.
The capital concern about proxy advisors is related to their capac-
ity of  granting independent and conflict-free voting recommendations to 
their clients, yet with the expanding of  their activities they have turned 
to give advice also to boards of  directors in order to improve their corpo-
rate governance. This expansion of  their service have left some sensitive 
subject matters prone to conflict of  interest, especially those identified as 
“Say on Pay” issues which include questions such as the remuneration of  
executives, salary and bonus of  directors, performance pay and pensions 
among others.26 It has been identified that nowadays, some proxy advisors 
provide corporate governance and executive compensation consulting 
services as well as voting recommendations on proposals at shareholder 
elections, situation that may create conflicts of  interest.
In an ideal scenario the influence of  proxy advisors would encour-
age boards to work on addressing the issues that investors do not like, 
specially those concerning remuneration of  officers, or rather, to improve 
disclosures to better inform shareholders of  their best interests for such 
remunerations; unfortunately it rarely happens in such a way. It is crucial 
for shareholders to exercise their right to have the corporation managed 
honestly and prudently for the benefit and profit of  the shareholders, and 
not in the economic interest of  directors:
…(T)he traditional model of  directorial accountability to the shareholders 
depends heavily upon the ability of  the shareholders in general to review 
the performance of  the board (notably when the annual report and accounts 
are presented to them) and to take decisions if  they think that performance 
26  For instance and regarding ISS it was said that; “Because it provides both type of  
services, ISS could, for example, help a corporate client develop an executive compensa-
tion proposal to be submitted for shareholder approval while at the same time making a 
recommendation to investor clients on how to vote for this proposal”. GAO, report p. 4.
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has not been adequate, for example, by removing the existing directors and 
installing a new board.27
Still, the phenomenon of  shareholders activism and the power of  in-
fluence of  proxy firms affect directly the corporate governance making 
board of  directors wary about proxy advisors which, in order to assure 
their management may feel compelled to retain proxy consulting services 
in order to obtain favorable proxy vote recommendations.
Without any doubt, proxy firms have become a powerful tool when 
the board and institutional investors contest over matters such as the elec-
tion of  directors. An institutional investor that seeks to elect directors to a 
company board or to approve a specific resolution, will have to persuade 
one or more proxy advisors to recommend his proposition over the man-
agement; thus, executives have to confront the reality of  the power influ-
ence in the hands of  proxy firms, as an author pointed out “the services’ 
influence has certainly been growing in the wake of  corporate scandals 
and ever more heated debates over ethical behavior and attention to social 
responsibility issues”.28 In addition, a second scenario of  possible conflict 
was identified by the Report in the case that officials from a proxy firm 
own interests over corporations in which the firms are offering vote rec-
ommendations, but the greater concern was that policies regarding con-
flicts of  interest are not fully disclosed by proxy firms.
Moreover, the experts working on the Report noted that there might 
be a problem of  competition barriers issued by the actual players. Al-
though new firms have entered into the market the position of  the main 
companies has been regarded by some professional as a barrier to com-
petition. Large proxy firms have confirmed their long-standing position 
due to the access of  great sources of  information that allows them to offer 
accurate research services; which on the contrary, will be difficult for new 
firms to develop in the beginning.
27  Davies, L. Paul, Gower and Davies’ Principles of  Modern Company Law, Seventh edition, 
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p. 327.
28  Proxy Advisors Find Themselves in the Spotlight, May 17, 2010 by James Hyatt http://busi-
ness-ethics.com/2010/05/17/243-proxy-advisors-find-themselves-in-the-spotlight/. It is a fact that 
other types of  corporations are being attracted by the business of  proxy advisory, specially 
for the big profits and fast growth. There is even interest from credit rating agencies such 
as Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s to enter into the business. When such corporations are 
appealed by an activity is normally for strong financial reasons.
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Concerning measures to promote competition among proxy firms 
some solutions have been suggested in the framework for other similar 
entities such as credit rating agencies. Opening the competition among 
proxy advisors is desirable too, as it could reduce the risk that some firm 
may exercise undue influence over corporate voting. At this respect, the 
regulation work seems harder since there are some external barriers such 
as the high costs for establishing information networks like the ones estab-
lished by the largest proxy firms. In this context, regulators acknowledge 
that there would be a hard work to try to set up rules against competition 
barriers when the clients’ preference appoints to strength the position of  
the largest proxy firms.
In the Report some other issues were mentioned for example, con-
cerning the information gathered by proxy firms. If  it is true that it is 
expensive to initially research companies and come up with voting rec-
ommendations, this may incite firms to re-sell that research to as many 
customers as possible. Information is an important asset in nowadays busi-
nesses and selling of  such asset may represent important incomes.29 De-
plorably, the GAO report did not depth in such question and offered just 
a superficial review.
Another problem that has become evident is that some proxy firms 
offer standard voting policies, which represent a low-cost means by which 
some institutional investors look to discharge their proxy voting responsi-
bilities. Nonetheless these policies are not exactly in accordance or sup-
ported by notions of  good governance and are usually applied without 
taking into account the specific circumstances of  the corporations.
Finally, a strong criticism was made against the lack of  accountability 
and oversight enjoyed by proxy advisors under United States and Euro-
pean Union regulations. “Compared to other market participants, proxy 
advisors appear to operate in a regulatory vacuum”.30 As Fleischer points 
out, they owe no fiduciary duties to the companies whose policies they 
seek to influence, and they have no economic interest at stake.
29  “Moreover, there have been reports of  one particular proxy advisor selling vot-
ing information —in the sense that companies are notified of  how institutional investors 
have been instructed to vote in return for payment”. Fleischer, Holger, “Proxy Advisors in 
Europe: Reform Proposals and Regulatory Strategies”, European Company Law, vol. 9, pp. 
12-20, 2012; Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 12/4, p. 14.
30  See for example Matsouros, P., “Is the EU Taking Shareholders Rights Seriously?”, 
European Company Law, 7 (2010): 199, 195; from Fleischer, op. cit.
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Even though GAO found that various potential conflicts might arise 
at proxy advisors firms it was not identified any violation to regulations by 
these firms. Nevertheless is to be kept in mind that, as M. Harvey Pitt, for-
mer SEC Chairman expressed during the debates: “The potential for con-
flicts of  interest is there… Mercifully we haven’t seen the worst potential 
realized, but we clearly have to anticipate that where money is involved 
people sometimes do strange things”. The GAO Report raised awareness 
of  the situation in the United States; nevertheless it does not seem to have 
triggered any international regulatory measures. Since there is a lack of  
international regulation it is important to take a look on the national regu-
lations at this stage.
V. Current reGulatory measures
Once the possible issues concerning proxy advisors have been pointed-
out, it becomes fundamental to analyze the existing legal frame for the 
activities of  proxy firms. It is important to take a look over the existing 
regulation in order to understand the basis in which proxy advisors are 
working, which are the limits for such activities and if  there are remedies 
for breach of  their duties. In this paper we use the example of  the United 
States and the European Union (with a particular regard to the Unit-
ed Kingdom and France) as hints to acquire an overview on the matter. 
Generally speaking the American rulings are nowadays the more updated 
regulation concerning proxy firms, followed by the United Kingdom. In 
Europe, there are no common dispositions related to proxy advisors and 
the rulings have a national source. Until recent years, regulators have be-
come aware of  such lack of  provisions and have reacted at this respect, as 
we shall see in this development.
1. United States
At present in the Unites States there is no regulation enacted specifi-
cally for the proxy advisory industry; still, there are some applicable regu-
lations to such activities among diverse acts that are useful to establish 
some directives and that must be taken into account as the may constitute 
the basis of  more developed regulation. For instance, under the Section 
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14(a) Securities Exchange Act of  1934,31 the Securities Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) regulates the proxy solicitation process32 with respect to 
publicly traded equity securities. This is not a much-extended regulation; 
however, it constitutes the primary regulation concerning proxy system 
of  voting. The relevance of  Section 14(a) is that this is the source of  the 
SEC’s regulating power; pursuant this section, the SEC has promulgated 
a set of  Proxy Rules that cover basically proxy solicitation.
As complement of  the previous mentioned Act, the SEC regulates 
the activities of  proxy advisors that are registered before the Commission 
as investment advisers, under the Investments Advisers Act of  1940. Nev-
ertheless, not all the major proxy advisors have registered as investment 
advisers and are not, therefore, subject to this regulation.33 From this rul-
ing, registered advisers are required to take specific measures in order to 
protect their clients, including disclosure about potential conflict of  inter-
ests.34 According to a US commentator, the fundamental moment for the 
proxy advisory industry came with the passage of  the 2003 Securities and 
Exchange Commission Rule; “Finally, in 2003, SEC adopted a rule and 
amendments under the Investment Advisers Act of  1940 that requires 
registered investment advisers to adopt policies and procedures reason-
ably designed to ensure that proxies in the best interest of  clients”.35
31  Due to the lack of  regulation, abuses in proxy soliciting became notorious and 
widespread encouraging the US Congress to enact in 1934, Section 14(a) of  the Securities 
Exchange Act; notwithstanding, this ruling does not frame private conduct, it has the only 
effect to authorize the SEC to enact rules that will govern it.
32  Proxy solicitation has been defined as “the process of  systematically contacting 
shareholders and urging them to execute and return proxy forms that authorize named 
proxy-holders to cast the shareholder’s vote, either in a manner designated in the proxy 
form of  according to the proxy-holder’s discretion”. Cary et al., op. cit., p. 334.
33  Some proxy advisors are subject to the US regulation established in the Investment 
Advisers Act 1940, and its regulatory developments such as the Proxy Voting by Invest-
ment Advisers 2003. Nevertheless the only firms subject to these rules are those registered 
as Investment Advisors before the Securities Exchange Commission, as is the case for ISS. 
From the major proxy advisory firms only some of  them are registered with SEC as invest-
ment advisers.
34  The appointed authority to watch the application of  such rules is the Securities 
Exchange Commission, it is charged to monitor compliance through periodical exami-
nations to registered advisers. In case of  violations and depending on their degree, SEC 
is entrusted to send recommendations or rather set fines if  there is some contravention 
against the law.
35  GAO report page 7.
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Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act36 enacted in summer of  2010, frame the 
regulation of  proxy advisors but only in processes known as say on pay, 
mostly in compensation practices in corporations. This regulation was 
passed looking forward to attack proxy advisors practices when applying 
one-size-fits all voting policies and requiring them to exercise a deeper 
analysis of  the particular situation at every corporation when issuing rec-
ommendations on say-on-pay matters.
2. European Union
The activities of  proxy firms are barely regulated in the United States 
but not so in Europe with the exception of  the United Kingdom that have 
some provisions regarding proxy votes soliciting. In the United Kingdom, 
the Companies Act of  2006 regulates matters related to the process of  
proxy soliciting through sections 324 to 327; nevertheless, such provisions 
are only related to proxy system of  voting and do not establish provisions for 
advisory industry. The same situation accounts for the existing regulation in 
France were the Monetary and Financial Code regulates the proxy voting 
but does not establish specific regulation over proxy advisors.
Taking into account the lack of  regulation for the proxy advisory in-
dustry some governments in the European Union and the EU it-self  have 
summoned experts and professionals in order to analyze the situation. For 
the sake of  this paper we take support on three different recommenda-
tions issued by the French, British and European authorities. 
In France, the Financial Markets Authority (AMF)37 published in 
2011, a recommendation over proxy advisors.38 The AMF manifested fa-
vorable to the exercise of  voting rights by shareholders at general meetings 
and reminded that institutional investors are accountable before the stock-
holders for whose they manage assets, and their practices regarding voting 
rights must be in the best interest of  stockholders. Previously, in 2005, the 
AMF issued a recommendation39 stating that the exercise of  voting rights 
36  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
37  Autorité des Marchés Financiers.
38  Recommandation AMF No 2011-06 sur les agences de conseil en vote.
39  “Pour l’amélioration de l’exercice des droits de vote des actionnaires en France” – 
Rapport du groupe de travail de l’AMF de septembre 2005. «L’exercice du droit de vote 
constitue pour les investisseurs institutionnels une responsabilité de grande importance. Il 
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by institutional investors must be preceded by an exhaustive analysis and 
not to apply only without control the opinions issued by proxy sharehold-
ers by applying their own judgment while voting resolutions. 
The AMF encourage institutional investors to develop their own vote 
policies; it was clearly stated that, even if  institutional investors hire proxy 
advisors this does not free them from their responsibility before sharehold-
ers. At the same, it extends an invitation to issuers in order to keep informed 
the Board of  Directors about communications with proxy advisors about 
their recommendations. The recommendation was directed to proxy advi-
sory firms, and suggested the elaboration and application of  voting policy. 
It is an open invitation for transparency in the activities of  proxy advisors 
considering this quality as essential. For this reason, the AMF encouraged 
proxy firms to publish their general policies at their web site and appealed 
proxy advisors to define and publish at their web site, the appropriate and 
reasonable measures in order to avoid conflict of  interests that may affect 
the proxy firm, the stockholders or others. The advice urged to prepare a 
code of  ethics and ensure its implementation. The suggestions were made 
in wide terms; nevertheless, it is to be kept in mind that this recommenda-
tion may be the seed of  further regulation in France.
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
released its UK Stewardship Code in July 2010, suggesting a disclosure 
regime under which institutional investors disclose how they use services 
provided by proxy advisory firms. This recommendation focuses in insti-
tutional investors and question if  these are exercising enough diligence 
and care when it comes to managing relationships with proxy advisors. 
“With regard to the regulation of  proxy advisors themselves, however, the 
UK Government takes a very cautious stance: Unless there is a clear evi-
dence that a regulatory response is necessary and justifiable in cost-benefit 
terms, the Unite Kingdom favors non regulatory measures…”.40 
At the European level the concerning regulator is the European Se-
curities and Markets Authority (ESMA) published a discussion paper41 in 
doit être précédé d’un examen attentif  du sens et de la portée des résolutions proposées 
permettant de porter sur elles un jugement circonstancié, et ne doit pas en particulier se 
limiter à appliquer sans contrôle des grilles d’analyse ou des recommandations élaborées 
par des sociétés de conseil de vote».
40  Fleischer, op. cit., p. 16.
41  The discussion paper considered the state and structure of  the proxy adviser market 
in the European Union. It focused in the factors that may influence the accuracy, indepen-
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order to analyze the regulation of  proxy advisers. In its corporate gov-
ernance paper issued in April 2011, concerns were expressed about the 
role of  proxy advisers and a fact-finding exercise was then carried out by 
ESMA. Nevertheless (as the Accountability Office in the United States) 
the ESMA does no state formal proposals but looks for opinions under 
four alternatives; (a) taking no action at EU level; (b) encouraging the de-
velopment of  improved investor protection and proxy advising standards; 
(c) recommending the development of  quasi-binding European regulatory 
instruments or; (d) recommending the introduction of  formal legislative 
measures.
The ESMA published the opinions and feedback to the discussion pa-
per and issued a Final Report on the Proxy Advisory Industry.42 The result 
of  the analysis was the issuing of  a recommendation that reads as follows: 
The Report has found that there is no current market failure related to proxy 
advisors interaction with investors and issuers in the European Union (EU), 
which would require regulatory intervention. However, ESMA has identi-
fied a number of  concerns regarding the independence of  proxy advisors, 
and the accuracy and reliability of  the advice provided which would benefit 
from improved clarity and understanding amongst stakeholders… ESMA 
is recommending that the proxy advising industry should develop an EU 
Code of  Conduct (Code) that focuses on: identifying, disclosing and mana-
ging conflicts of  interest; and fostering transparency to ensure the accuracy 
and reliability of  the advice.43
VI. ConClusion
From the previous analysis, it is possible to say that the role of  proxy advi-
sors in corporate voting process involves intricate questions to lawmakers 
and legal scholars. On the one hand, proxy advisors provide a valuable 
dence and reliability of  proxy advice such as the potential for conflicts. This paper, tried 
to foresee the methodology of  proxy advisors and their dialogue with issuers, but also, the 
degree of  transparency on the management of  conflicts and voting policies and guidelines.
42  Available on http://www.esma.europa.eu/content/Feedback-statement-consultation-regarding-
role-proxy-advisory-industry.
43  Available on http://www.esma.europa.eu/news/ESMA-recommends-EU-Code-Conduct-
proxy-advisor-industry.
Esta revista forma parte del acervo de la Biblioteca Jurídica Virtual del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM 
www.juridicas.unam.mx https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/
BJV, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas-UNAM, 
2017
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iij.24484873e.2017.148.11003
PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS (ON THE OPPORTUNITY... 357
D. R. © 2017. UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 
Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, núm. 148, pp. 337-359.
service to institutional investors and shareholders in general. On the other 
hand, they have become a powerful industry with a heavy influence on the 
corporate matters without a proper regulation. In light of  these ambivalent 
findings, there is a patent need for action in order to avoid situations where 
proxy advisors exercise undue power or act without the due diligence but 
also in order to avoid conflict of  interest.
As we could see authorities from different countries have expressed 
their concern and opened the debate about the present and the future 
of  proxy advisors. The general conclusion of  the experts considered that 
there are, for the time being, no conduct to punish from the activities and 
services developed by the major proxy advisors. Nevertheless, as the recent 
financial crisis and corporate governance scandals have demonstrated, it 
seems desirable to enhance regulation to a certain point before problems 
start to show-up specially when such entities participating as auxiliaries 
in the corporate governance of  publicly held corporations might yield a 
great impact in day-to-day life. 
 In the present day a direct regulation from governmental agencies 
seems hardly plausible and it is not clear if  future national regulations for 
proxy advisors will arrive. The reports issued by the competent authori-
ties (market regulators) do not point-out a need for regulation, still there 
is a dissenting feeling that proxy advisors should be under some kind of  
control. In this context it seems to be an opportunity for international or-
ganizations to deep the analysis and develop a common code of  conduct 
that will help enhance both the practices and the security of  the market.
Even though if  a few of  the largest proxy advisors have started to de-
velop internal codes of  conduct voluntarily (with the hope to bring con-
fidence to their clients and respond to the concerns about their practices) 
we argue instead for the participation of  international organizations given 
the cross-border dimension of  proxy advisory services and the fact that 
there are almost identical problems in many countries, it goes almost with-
out saying that unilateral national action will only be of  limited success.
The existing and closest regulation is focused on proxy holders who 
have been traditionally considered as agents of  the shareholder who en-
trust them. Those holders are regarded by the law as fiduciaries and are 
subject to the inherent duties in the conception of  the agency; notwith-
standing, proxy advisors are not, properly said, proxy holders. Certainly 
the better approach for regulation, since there are no flagrant violations, 
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is the one by self-regulation as the authorities have expressed in their rec-
ommendations. It seems more suitable that to the traditional congressio-
nal process. There is an interesting and continued suggestion from some 
professionals to promote internal codes of  ethics among proxy advisors; 
such codes may be issued internally or may be adopted voluntarily from 
the proposition of  an international organization. There are some existing 
examples of  this type of  self-regulation applicable to other analogous enti-
ties such as the credit rating agencies.
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